Introduction

Post-Cold War experience indicates that deployment of the Armed Forces for
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) will be increasingly more likely than deployment for more traditional conventional combat. With this relatively recent realization, military education and training programs are being revamped to ensure that future joint task force (JTF) commanders are prepared to command these operations. The MOOTW poses daunting problems. Leaders could be required to fulfill an unfamiliar and unclear mission, with unknown partners and enemies, in a strange, dynamic cultural environment, with unfamiliar geography and surrounded by human misery and corruption. Such a personal and professional external challenge could easily overwhelm the JTF Commander, consuming his thought process and directing his total attention to a variety of problems external to his military unit. However, at the same time as these substantial external challenges, the commander faces another immense challenge critical to his unit's military readiness. This is his responsibility to preserve the psychological readiness of the troops under his command. Fragile in any deployed situation, the mental well being of the armed forces are particularly susceptible to the vast uncertainties of MOOTW.
Psychological Stress Imposed by MOOTW
In past conventional conflicts, soldiers fought their war and then were discharged to their civilian lives along with any psychological disorders that they may have developed as a result of their military service. 1 Some old school veterans and military planners question why today's service members need to be provided any other special treatment. After all, doesn't a MOOTW, as an operation other than conventional war, pose less danger of affecting the psyche of the soldier than the large, bloody battles of past world and regional conflicts?
The difference between the psychological disorders experienced by soldiers in past conventional conflicts and today's MOOTW operations lies in the duration and intensity of the psychological Stressors 2 . Experience to date with MOOTW deployments indicates that these operations are characterized less by intense traumatic events producing major psychiatric disorders. While MOOTWs may include brief periods of trauma and acute stress, they seem to more typically impose chronic mild to moderate stress on the troops. objectives. This can make it difficult for soldiers to understand the values underlying a campaign-and to recognize any value of their own contributions. 8 Many deployed troops may have been trained with special skills to participate in a conventional armed conflict. Being deployed overseas and being told to direct their efforts towards a far different objective -for instance, protecting food distribution, or maintaining order in a refugee camp -can be mentally frustrating. The soldiers may actually resent the mission, even more so in the often austere conditions of such a deployment.
Research on the Somalia MOOTW indicates that one of the principal stress factors of the deployed troops was the ambiguous mission. 9 The service members were justified in this discomfort. What began as a mission to assure the security of the relief workers and protect the food deliveries wound up costing more U.S. lives than in Panama, and more casualties per capita than the Persian Gulf War. Other sources of stress for the U.S. troops in Somalia were their beliefs that their superiors did not trust them and their sense that they were failing to do anything significant for the Somalis .
In Operation Uphold Democracy, the MOOTW deployment to Haiti, many soldiers perceived the mission to be pointless; resulting in disillusionment with the U.S.
military's efforts to improve the lives of the Haitians. This created another frustrating stress factor for deployed service members. In studying Somalia, it has been determined that the cumulative effect of the soldiers' perceived deficiencies in trust and information was a sense of failure and disillusionment. However, the consensus in post-Somalia analysis is that the soldiers had not failed. They had maintained their poise and discipline and assured relief of the In Haiti, the commanders apparently made little effort to convince their troops that their contributions were valuable. In fact, many soldiers complained that they were not trusted and were treated like children. The Haitian operation has lead psychiatrists to speculate that most stress is avoidable if commanders implement basic precepts of leadership -taking care of the troops, and making sure that their time, energy and abilities are used productively; and telling the troops the whole truth early and often. In addition, when the leader does not know the entire truth about the nature of or reasons for the mission, psychiatrists recommend that he say so.
In the likely event that the MOOTW mission changes or evolves, the joint commander needs to immediately convey the clarification to his troops, so that mentally, they can adjust to focus all of their actions and contributions to the re-defined mission.
The pitfall with the "Objective" dimension of MOOTW is a joint commander's tendency to focus on achieving mission success and his upward focus on proving himself to his superiors. However, he will never achieve mission success if he ignores the mental frustrations created in his troops by not keeping them informed of the mission objective.
One is reminded of the scene in Saving Private Ryan where the Tom Hanks character, as the leader of the group sent to find Private Ryan, is continually subjected to the complaints of his troops about the mission that they have been directed to perform.
After a particularly intense complaint session, a member of the platoon asks Tom Hanks why he doesn't gripe about the worthlessness of the mission? Tom Hanks' reply was, "I gripe up. I don't gripe down." The joint commander would do well to follow this advice in his role in future MOOTW missions. In the other extreme from boredom, soldiers deployed to Somalia were subjected to hostile words and gestures from mobs of Somalis at close quarters -even when these soldiers were not involved in conflict. 20 Depending on the mental stability of the service members, the incidences could easily present an opportunity for hostile factions to take advantage of the American soldiers by provoking them into combat.
Implications for JTF Commander: To a large extent the stress imposed by the security aspect of MOOTW can be solved by adhering to General Zinni's
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recommendation that the U.S. military should try hard not to make enemies.
Other advice to the JTF Commander on maintaining security can be found in "lessons learned" in Somalia -that a balance be "struck between the requirement for restraint and the security of the force." This advice spills over to the Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the MOOTW. In recognition of the effect of competing mental demands on his troops, the commander must keep in mind how these ROE might be applied in tense situations by warfighters rather than lawyers."
Restraint
Apply appropriate military capability prudently. (In a MOOTW, Rules of
Engagement (ROE) are generally more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in full scale conventional war.) 23 Implications for Psyche of Armed Forces: Service members should understand the ROE of any deployment. This is especially true in a MOOTW during which service members may be using adapted or completely new skills to achieve what may be nebulous political objectives such as maintaining peace or protecting food distribution. Unclear rules of engagement and mission purpose, coupled with long periods of inactivity and frustrated aggression, introduce unique Stressors. 24 In a MOOTW, the actual detail and restraint required in the ROE could create smoldering tensions and resentments in the service member already disgusted with the nature of the deployment to begin with. Unstable service members can be walking mental time bombs with the potential to escalate the conflict by exceeding the prescribed ROE at any provocation. By doing so, the individual service member could inadvertently destroy the success of the entire MOOTW mission or unnecessarily escalate the conflict for all the belligerents, subjecting the mission to a characteristic of all complex humanitarian emergencies -"the law of unintended consequences." 25 One recent finding of military researchers was that a particular Stressor of peacekeeping missions is the lack of an opportunity to release aggression. While soldiers involved in conventional conflict have opportunities to release aggression, MOOTW participants must restrain this aggression. It was this frustrated aggression and need for restraint that is believed to have played a role in the early high rate of psychiatric problems of US troops in Haiti. Some speculate that the last minute change of the Haitian mission from combat to peacekeeping contributed to the difficulties some of the troops had in adjusting to the mission. 26 The need for the soldiers of tomorrow's MOOTW deployment to exercise psychological restraint is specified in Joint Pub 3-07.3. This doctrinal prescription for future peacekeepers calls for "a professional demeanor that stresses quiet diplomacy and reasoning" rather than "arrogance, anger, disdain, coercion or sarcasm. Personnel must be able to cope positively when each side seeks to press its position and then reacts vocally when stopped." However, this psychological restraint may be easier described in a Joint Pub than achieved in the field when a soldier trained to "take that hill" at any cost is asked to cope positively with quiet diplomacy and reasoning. During Desert Storm, while not a MOOTW or a protracted operation by any means, troops did suffer from the stress imposed by having to persevere in the harsh environment, with the persistent fear that the Iraqis would use chemical weapons. 29 This is certainly a potential stress factor in future MOOTWs -the need to persevere in light of the fear that the enemy or an as\-mmetric terrorist will actually employ chemical or biological weapons.
As for MOOTW-specific perseverance, the Uphold Democracy operation in Haiti resulted in a sense on the part of the troops that the deployment was prolonged excessively. In addition, the general discomfort of the troops made perseverance difficult. Eighty-four percent of soldiers surveyed two months into the mission complained about poor sanitation to include insufficient number of toilets, toilets that were rarely emptied, foul water, and no showers. Seventy-four percent of the soldiers worried about contracting life-threatening diseases. The food was viewed as monotonous and inadequate. The perception by some was that the commanders were living in much greater, air-conditioned comfort.
Implications for JTF Commander: The joint commander is responsible for minimizing his troops' discomforts while acknowledging those that they must all endure. Soldiers can live in discomfort and adapt to unfamiliar missions, and will even perform jobs not appropriate to their training, if the vertical cohesion is maintained -the "strongest buffer against stress". It has been shown that this cohesion starts to unravel when commanders are not honest about the conditions that need to be suffered in order to persevere or do not acknowledge the unreasonableness of unavoidable demands.
Particularly critical to the ability of the U.S. military to persevere, is the JTF Commander's responsibility to identify and monitor "high stress" units and individuals.
These are individuals or units who have had a highly stressful recent deployment or experienced death of unit members; have demonstrated a higher than usual arrest rate or more frequent visits to the outpatient medical facility; have higher absences without leave, requests for transfer; homicidal threats, or suicide attempts. If needed and called for by mental health professionals, the JTF commander should initiate job rotation, enforced rest and relaxation, and if indicated, an evacuation for psychiatric treatment, as specified in the Combat Stress Reduction directive.
The will of the troops to persevere would also be improved by ensuring the capability and time to communicate with home through phone and mail, to include email services. 
Legitimacy
Conclusion
Past MOOTW experiences provide much information on the psychological impact of these deployments on the mental well being of individual service members and units. Some of the resulting recommendations for future commanders may appear to be no more than common sense that any military leader who rises to the rank of JTF commander should already know (i.e., keep your troops well fed and comfortable, ensure that they are aware of their mission). However, the competing command requirements of a MOOTW and the less than direct military action demands merit a reminder to the Commander of the importance of these basic requirements. "We've got to stop thinking of [service members] as being automatons who just take orders, to go off over the horizon and forget about the world until such time as they may come back." 36 Accordingly, good mental health preservation and psychological stress prevention procedures need to be consciously adopted by future JTF commanders, rather than being left to the trompe l'oeil of operational art.
Also to this end, future commanders would benefit from more emphasis in senior training courses on stress prevention and management techniques. As the Combat Stress
Control directive recommends, senior service schools should include psychological stress studies in their curriculum -so that commanders can recognize symptoms of deployment related stress in themselves and their troops. Courses such as those taught by the Army War College on human performance, stress reduction and mental fitness such as "Men in
Battle", would be good topics to cover at the other War Colleges at least as an optional elective. 37 It would also be beneficial for future commanders if individual stress management/executive Wellness were given a higher priority for instruction for War
College attendees. This would improve the future commander's understanding of potential stress factors and facilitate his ability to diagnosis the decline of mental well being -both in himself and in his troops.
All Service members are finding that they need to employ unfamiliar skills during MOOTW deployments -such as the "approachable, understanding, and tactful manner" prescribed for peacekeepers. 38 The Joint Commander may also need to dig deeper into his own leadership skill tool box to sustain troop mental health and to prevent anticipated stress factors from affecting his troops' will to perform their military functions. Through his understanding of potential stress factors, knowledge of stress prevention techniques, and the use of superior communication skills, the JTF commander of future MOOTW will be able to preserve the psychological well being of the U.S. military's most valuable asset -its service members.
